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A. INTRODUCTION: THE SHARIA AND LEGAL PRACTICE 
The Sharia (shad'a) is usually defined as the ideal religious law of Islam. 
The practical application of the Sharia, however, is an open question for debate. 
The traditional opinion that Islamic law emerged from religious speculation 
and is completely detached from actual legal practice* is replaced by a more 
careful and differentiated view. It is generally accepted that the Sharia is not to 
be equated with legal practice, although the two are often closely related. 
Obvious differences are dependent on spatial and temporal considerations.^ 
The origin of Islamic law is seen in the discussion of Umayyad legal practice 
and administration.^ Law evolved according to the social and economic 
variables of early Abbasid times, as is clearly evident in the literature 
concerning legal devices (hiyal) and legal formularies (shurüt)^ The concept of 
the Sharia becoming more rigid with the passage of time^ has been increasingly 
debated of late. Recent studies indicate that change was indeed reflected in the 
Sharia,^ especially through the legal opinions (fatàwà) of the muftünJ 
^ Coulson, N. J., A History of Islamic Law, Edinburgh, 1964, 82; id., «The State and the 
Individual in Islamic Law», International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 6 (1975), 57; cf. 
Goldziher, L, «Muhammedanisches Recht in Théorie und Wirklichkeit», Zeitschrift fur 
vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, 8 (1889), 406, 409; Bousquet, G.-H., Du droit musulman et son 
application effective dans le monde, Algiers, 1949, 7. 
^ Noth, A., «Die Scharia - das religiose Recht des Islam - Wandlungsmoglichkeiten, 
Anwendung und Wirkung», Fikentscher, W., Franke, H., and Kohler, C , (éd.), Entstehung und 
Wandel rechtlicher Traditionen, Freiburg and Miinchen, 1980,415; Watt, W. M., Welch, A. T., Der 
Islam, Teil I: Mohanmied und die Frühzeit - Islamisches Recht - Religioses Leben, Stuttgart, 
Berlin, Koln, Mainz, 1980, 233. 
^ Schacht, J., The Origins ofMuhammadan Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1950, 190 ff; Watt, Islam, 
240; Hallaq, W. B., «Fromfatwàs to furü': Growth and Change in Islamic substantive Law», 
Islamic Law and Society, 1,1 (1994), 29, 30; critically Burton, J., An Introduction to the Hadith, 
Edinburgh, 1994, XXH. 
^ Schacht, J., An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford, 1964, Reprint Hongkong, 1984,75, 210. 
^ Schacht, Introduction, 75; cf Sjukijajnen, L., Musulmanskoe pravo, Moskow, 1986, 94 f. 
^ Tyan, É., «Le notariat et le régime de la preuve par écrit dans la pratique du droit 
musulman». Annales de la Faculté de Droit, Beyrouth, 2 (1945), 3 ff; id., «La Procédure du 
«Défaut» en Droit Musulman», Studia Islámica, 1 (1957), 115 ff; Johansen, B., «Eigentum, Famille 
und Obrigkeit im hanafitischen Strafrecht», Die Welt des Islams, 19 (1979), 1 ff; id., The Islamic 
Law on Land Tax and Rent, London etc., 1988; Ziadeh, F. J., «Compelling Defendant's Appearence 
at Court in Islamic Law», Islamic Law and Society, 3,3 (1996), 305 ff; Jokisch, B., Islamisches 
Recht in Théorie und Praxis, Berlin, 1996, 261. 
^ Hallaq, «Fromfatwàs to furü'», 29 ff; Jokisch, Islamisches Recht, 11. 
Al-Qantara, vol. 20, nº 2 (1999)
(c) Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
Licencia Creative Commons 
Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional (CC BY 4.0)
http://al-qantara.revistas.csic.es
418 P. SCHOLZ AQ. XX, 1999 
Two questions are central to the relationship between Sharia and legal 
practice: To what extent does the Sharia include the rules of legal practice? To 
what extent were the rules of the Sharia applied in practice? The first question 
refers to the abihty of the Sharia to absorb and adapt to legal practice. The 
second question underscores the importance of the Sharia for legal practice. 
The two questions are not necessarily related. To the extent that legal practice 
has found its way into the Sharia, it is likely that the Sharia was applied in 
practice. However, a rule of the Sharia which evolved in practice in a specific 
place and time was not necessarily appHed in another place or at another time. 
A rule of the Sharia applied in practice need not have evolved in practice. It can 
be of purely speculative origin. This essay will deal exclusively with the ability 
of the Sharia to absorb and adapt to legal practice, investigating specifically the 
incorporation of legal practice into the Sharia, using the Malikite law of 
procedure up to the 6**^ /12* century as an example. 
The Sharia has been elaborated by legal scholars (fuqahà ') and laid down 
in their writings. This literature embodies works of diverse dimension, genre 
and purpose, such as theoretical works of law (usül literature) and monographs 
concerning special legal topics, short manuals for legal studies and very 
extensive reference law texts (furW literature), as well as various manuals of 
legal practice (especially adab aUqàdi literature) including books of legal 
formularies (shumt literature) and extensive collections of sentences (ahkàm 
literature) and legal opinions (fatàwà literature).^ The existence of legal 
practice literature demonstrates that the Sharia could not be composed solely of 
theoretical speculations. Such literature presupposes the analysis and digestion 
of problems of legal practice, as well as its practical necessity. 
It is likely that there exists a special relationship between literature and legal 
practice because the authors of these writings were not only legal scholars but 
also qudàt, muftün or other officials.^ The qàdi decided the outcome of lawsuits 
and in this way formed legal precedents, whereas the mufti only offered legal 
opinions. Thus he also influenced legal relationships as his opinions were often 
observed by the qàdi in settling disputes. Other officials applied the Sharia 
within the scope of their official activities, for example when exercising their 
^ A survey is given by Spuler, B. (éd.), Handbuch fur die Orientalistik, 1. Abteilung, 3. 
Erganzungsband: Orientalisches Recht, Leiden and Koln, 1964, 237 ff. 
9 For example. Asad b. al-Furàt (d. 213/828), Sahnün b. Sa'id (d. 189/854), 'Isa b. Sahi (d. 
486/1093) and Ibn Rushd —grandfather (d. 520/1126) and grandson (d. 595/1198)— were qu(Bt. 
For example, Malik b. Anas (d. 179/796) and Ibn AM Zaid al-Qayrawânî (d. 386/996) were muftün. 
Other offices were held, for example, by Ibn al-Labbád (d. 333/944; mamlim office) and 'Abd al-
Malik b. Habib (d. 238/852; first mufti, then part of the shura). 
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juridical functions or exacting rehgious taxes. It is therefore improbable that 
scholars who solved legal questions speculatively and wrote a theoretical system 
of law would at the same time apply a different law in practice. 
This essay seeks to investigate the extent to which legal practice permeated the 
Jum^ literature. The uniformity of legal uterature argues in favour of such influence. 
This is perhaps due to the fact that both theoretical and practical legal uterature 
were written by the same authors who were often also legal professionals.^^ 
Initially, legal practice influenced the Sharia in so far as it had permeated 
into the Quran or hadith. There cases and general practical proceedings are 
described from which institutions, regulations and single rules of law are 
derived. The legal practice which has influenced the Sharia in this way is static 
and historical in nature. The Quran and hadith are invariable texts of the first 
Islamic centuries and thus fall outside the remit of this study. Instead, attention 
will be drawn to the extent to which formerly current legal practice permeated 
the Sharia and the lawbooks. We shall attempt to understand the Sharia's 
adjustment to various alterations in society over time. We have therefore 
examined the procedural regulations of the most important Malikite lawbooks 
up to the 6* /^12* century for relevant material. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE MALIKITE PROCEDURAL LAW WITH REGARD TO LEGAL 
PRACTICE 
I. Legal Institutions and Regulations close to Legal Practice 
The close relationship of legal institutions and regulations to legal practice is 
demonstrated by various criteria. The description of irrelevant circumstances, 
complex and unusual details and technical subject matter all indicate practical 
origin of actual cases. Cases in lawbooks derive from legal practice, if their facts 
are based in reality. It is therefore important to also examine the specific details. 
1. Irrelevant Circumstances 
The Mudawwana discusses a case in which a traveller maintains that he 
hired a horse or a camel to Mecca for the price of 100 dirham. The owner of 
'0 For example, Malik b. Anas (d. 179/796), Asad b. al-Furat (d. 213/828), 'Abd al-Malik b. 
Habib (d. 238/852), Sahnün b. Sa'ïd (d. 189/854), Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawànï (d. 386/996), Ibn 
Rushd, grandfather (d. 520/1126) and grandson (d. 595/1198). 
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the animal maintains that a price of 200 dirham only to Medina was agreed. 
According to an anonymous opinion reported by Ibn al-Qásim,^^ both parties 
are plaintiffs (mudda'ün), the owner concerning the claimed surplus (fadla)^^ 
of 100 dirham, the traveller concerning the more distant city of Mecca. The 
case is described without specifically identifying the individuals involved. The 
exact tariff and destination are not intrinsic to the resolution of the case, but 
they considerably facilitate comprehension. We can therefore not conclude that 
these specifications demonstrate a basis in fact. 
In another account, Ibn al-Qasim presents the following opinion (qawl) of 
Malik: A man travelling to Ifriqiya^^ recognises an animal in Fustat^ "^  as his own 
and claims it with supporting evidence (bayyina). The possessor defends himself, 
maintaining that he had purchased the animal in Syria. He asserts his right (haqq) 
to return to Syria, in hope of obtaining regress from the vendor. If the claimant 
does not wish to wait for their return, he will have to nominate a representative 
to manage the case whilst he continues his journey to IfrîqiyâJ^ The essence of 
this case is the recognition of property in the possession of another at place A 
who asserts its sale from a third person at place B. The specifications of place A 
and place B facilitate comprehension. But the fact that the alleged owner 
recognises his animal on a journey to Ifrîqiyâ, thereby causing Ibn al-Qasim to 
create a supplementary regulation, is irrelevant to the comprehension of the case. 
It is therefore probable that this example is based on an actual case. 
Ibn al-Qasim reports on the following regulation in the same text. Malik 
was presented a case in which a slave confessed (iqràr) to having stepped 
forcibly on a child's toe, amputating it and causing much bleeding. Malik's 
opinion was that the slave's confession would be acceptable in the case of a 
recent injury. ^ ^ The confession is credible as the bleeding indicates the slave 
truly caused injury. The case was presented in the abstract because the 
individuals involved were not identified. The only relevant facts are the slave's 
confession and the child's injury. The specifics of the bleeding and the resulting 
loss of the toe are to be considered incidental information to the judgement. 
Especially the loss of the toe seems to indicate that this case is not altogether 
an abstract invention. 
' ' Student of Malik and transmitter of the Muwatta', teacher of Sahnün, d. 191/806. 
'^  Cf. Sahnün, Al-Mudawwana al-kubrà. Reprint of the Edition of Cairo in 1323 H, Bagdad, 
without year, Part IV, 485, cf. also 484. 
^^  Old name for the eastern part of the Maghreb. 
^'^ Former town in the area of present Cairo. 
15 Cf Sahnün, 1. c , VI 183. 
16 Cf Sahnün, 1. c., VI 373 f. 
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In the Mudawwana, we find the discussion of a blind man's testimony in a 
divorce case (talàq). Ibn al-Qásim tells us that Malik allowed the testimony of 
a man who overheard his neighbour divorce his wife behind a wall. The 
witness was not able to see his neighbour, but identified him by his voice. 
Former scholars of the Hijaz, Irak and Egypt also admitted such testimony.^^ 
From this regulation, Ibn al-Qásim concludes the admissibility of the blind 
man's testimony in the divorce. Again we have an abstract example because 
the man and his neighbour are not individualised. In arriving at a judgement, 
it is irrelevant that the man divorcing his wife is a neighbour of the witness 
and that the witness cannot see him because a wall separates the estates. The 
specific details of the case make it more probable that the example is in fact 
based on legal practice. 
In the same text, Sahnùn ponders his decision in the case of an individual 
who asserts that two envoys did not obey the order to buy a special slave. Both 
envoys deny the accusations and no witnesses are available. It is the opinion of 
Ibn al-Qásim, who remarks that he has had no information from Malik, that the 
decisive assertion is that of the two envoys (al-qawl qawluhumà) as the 
mandate has been acknowledged.^^ The case is discussed in the abstract. It is 
remarkable that there are two envoys. This fact is irrelevant for the solution or 
the comprehension of the case. Once again the case seems to be based on a 
factual occurrence. 
2. Complex and Uncommon Details 
One argument for the origin in legal practice of a case mentioned in 
lawbooks in that complex or uncommon facts cannot be explained by their 
systematic context. As a rule, these facts are indicative of a basis in fact rather 
than speculation. 
For example, in the Muwatta ', Máük describes a man who dies and bequeathes 
a claim in favour of his heirs and an obligation in favour of a third party. There is 
only one witness (shàhid) for every debt. The heirs (waratha) pretend their claim 
(dayn) and the creditors bring their claim on the estate. The heirs have the right to 
take their oaths in addition to the testimony of their witness, ^ ^ but they do not 
'7 Cf. Sahnûn, 1. c , m 43. 
1^  C/Sahnûn, L c , V 18L 
^^  As a rule, half evidence —i. e. testimony of one witness only— can be completed by the 
plaintiff's oath, see Scholz, Malikitisches Verfahrensrecht, Frankfurt/Main etc., 1997, 304 ff. 
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exercise this right. The creditors are given the opportunity to take the oath in 
addition to the testimony of their witness in order for their claim to be 
accepted. Once the creditors' claim has been paid, the remainder of the estate 
will not be paid out to the heirs because they have not exercised their right of 
oath.2o 
The specific facts of this case suggest its origin in legal practice. The heirs 
pretend a claim of the estate, the creditors bring a claim against the estate, both 
heirs and creditors have one witness apiece and the heirs refuse to give their 
oaths. The case is discussed in a separate chapter without any systematic or 
associative context. The facts and procedures described are obscure. It is not 
clear if the heirs' debtor is to be identified with the creditors. The estate does 
not only consist of the bequeathed claim because a remaining part of the estate 
is mentioned after fulfilling the obligation. The proceedings as described are 
incomprehensible. Although the claims are not interdependent, they are made 
interdependent, so that the creditors will only be allowed to swear their 
plaintiffs' oaths, if the heirs refuse to give their oaths, and the heirs will have 
no right on the rest of the estate, if the creditors' claim has been paid. All these 
circumstances lend weight to the hypothesis that the regulation is based on an 
actual case which is described incompletely. 
3. Technical Regulations 
Technical regulations also take legal practice into account in serving the 
execution of dogmatically relevant regulations. On their own, they are of little 
dogmatic value, relating mostly to formal proceedings. Their origin in legal 
practice is therefore quite probable. 
Some Mudawwana regulations concerning witness testimony are mainly 
technical in nature. If it is the responsibility of the plaintiff to give evidence in 
a lawsuit, the qàdi will ask him to do so. Such is the case in an abstract example 
described by Ibn al-Qàsim in which the recipient of a gift (mawhüb lahu) sues 
the giver (wàhib) for delivering the refused gift (hiba)?^ —If the witnesses 
testify, the qàdi will ask additional questions as necessary. In another regulation 
of Ibn al-Qasim, when the witness in a lawsuit testifies that the plaintiff is the 
rightful owner of disputed livestock, the qadi will ask if the plaintiff is known 
°^ Cf. Malik, Kitâb al-Muwatta', Recension of Yahyâ b. Yahyá ai-Masmüdí, Edition of 
Muhammad Fu'ad 'Abd al-Biqi, Cairo, 1370/1951, 725. 
21 Cf. Sahnün, 1. c , VI \ 
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to have sold the animal or to have given it away—?'^  The qàdi records the 
testimonies in a book (diwàn). Such is the case in a regulation of Ibn al-Qasim 
in which the qàdi dies or is dismissed between questioning the witnesses and 
pronouncing his judgement.^^ In such cases, it is necessary for the plaintiff to 
bring evidence and for the witnesses to testify. However, it is not important that 
the qàdi asks the plaintiff to furnish proof, that the testimony be complete or 
recorded in a register. The regulation is only concerned with the technical 
execution of the legal requirements. 
With regard to pronouncing judgements, there are some technical 
prescriptions in the same text. Malik's opinion, reported by Ibn al-Qasim, is that 
the qàdi should ask all parties (khasmàn), if they have any further arguments are 
to be brought forth.^ "^  Ibn Rushd in the Bidàya regulates that a judgement (hukm) 
be passed only after fixing a time-limit (darb al-ajl) for all the parties to present 
their arguments.^^ Such prescriptions guarantee the parties' hearing at court. 
Malik asks the parties for further arguments before deciding the case, whereas 
Ibn Rushd fixes a time-limit for the presentation of arguments. 
Further technical regulations exist. In some cases the qàdi needs a legal 
assistant. For example, in the Muwatta\ Malik discusses at length the litigation 
between pledgee (murtahin) and pledger (ràhin), in the case of the pledge (rahn) 
having perished. If the qàdi's dispensation of justice requires determination of 
the pledge's value, the qàdi will first ask the pledgee to describe the pledge and 
to swear on the description, before asking experts (ahl al-basar, ahl al-ma 'rifa) 
to estimate the value of the pledge.^^ In the Mudawwana, Ibn al-Qasim relates 
Malik's opinion that in straightforward legal cases the oaths of housebound 
women can be taken at their home by the qàdi's assistant.^^ 
The following regulation of Ibn al-Qasim in the Mudawwana concerns the 
procedure for exchange of judges. It is very much a technical rule. If a qàdi 
is dismissed or dies during a case after having heard the witnesses and written 
down their testimonies in a book (diwàn), the evidence will not necessarily 
have to be repeated before the new qàdi. In this case it has to be proved that 
the evidence was taken before the dismissal or death of the qàdi and 
registered in his book. If this cannot be proved, the suit will follow general 
22 Cf. Sahnûn, 1. c , VI 170. 
23 Cf. Sahnûn, 1. c , V 145 f. 
24 Cf Sahnûn, 1. c , V 132, VI 284. 
2^  Cf. Ibn Rushd, Bidàyat al-mujtahid wa-nikàyat al-muqtasid. Edition of 'Abd al-Halim 
Muhammad 'Abd al-Halim, 2"^ ^ Edition, Cairo, 1403/1983, Part H 582. 
26 Cf Malik, 1. c.', 730, 732. 
27 Cf Sahnûn, 1. c , V 135 f, 200. 
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rules.^^ The defendant is given the opportunity to swear a purgative oath 
(yamïn) that the attested evidence was not taken. If the defendant swears, the 
hearing of the witnesses must be repeated. If he does not swear, the plaintiff 
(tàlib) will have the right to swear that the attested evidence was taken. If he 
takes the oath, the hearing of the witnesses need not be repeated and the 
action will continue from where it left off.^ ^ The exchange of the qadi after 
evidence has been taken does not necessarily require a second hearing of the 
witnesses. The case will continue if the evidence taken is ascertained by 
witness testimony or denial of the defendant's oath in connection with the 
plaintiff's oath. This regulation states only the continuation of the current 
action in the case of exchange of qudàt following general procedural rules. 
The technical implementation of exchange of qudàt is very important in the 
example discussed. 
Here is a further example of Mudawwana regulations. The qàdi sustains the 
claim for the restitution of an animal The condemned possessor now wants to 
sue the person who sold him the animal pretending to be the rightful owner. 
The place of jurisdiction is the village of the seller. According to Malik in this 
case the possessor pays the value (qima) of the animal to the qàdi. The qàdi 
deposits this amount of money with a person of honest character ( 'adl). His seal 
is then placed on the animal's neck and he writes to the qàdi of the vendor's 
village that he has awarded the animal to such and such a person. The possessor 
may leave with the animal and sue the vendor in his village for the full 
repayment value (màl)?^ The technical character of this regulation indicates its 
origin in legal practice. 
4. Topics of Legal Practice 
In the fum ' works there are many regulations whose topic originates from 
legal practice or deals with its problems. None of these is of a particularly 
technical nature. 
Procedural problems within legal practice often result from distance 
between the parties involved in a case. Therefore, a letter from the qadi (kitàb 
al-qàdi) became necessary. It makes an action possible when the plaintiff and 
^^  If the plaintiff is not able to give evidence for his assertion, the defendant will be allowed 
to take the purgative oath. If the defendant does not swear, the plaintiff will have the right to take 
an affirmative oath. If the plaintiff swears, he will win the action. See Scholz, Verfahrensrecht, 63. 
29 Cf. Sahnûn, 1. c , V 145 f. 
30 C/Sahnûn, I.e., VI182 f. 
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the witnesses or —if the proceeding does not require a petition for 
judgement^^— only the witnesses live in a village far from the defendant. The 
qàdi who has heard the witnesses notifies the qàdi at the defendant's village of 
the testimonies as an aid to the latter in passing his judgement.^^ The contents 
of a kitàb al-qàdi can be witness evidence or judicial precedent. As in the 
previous example, the man travelling to Ifnqiyà recognises his lost animal in 
Fustàt. He sues its possessor, brings witness testimony (bayyina) and wins the 
action. The possessor maintains that he purchased the animal in Syria. He has 
the right (haqq) to take the animal to Syria and sue the seller for recourse.^^ 
With a letter from the qàdi in Fustat he can prove to the qàdi in Syria that he 
was condemned to give the animal back to its rightful owner. 
The protraction of a lawsuit resulting from distance between the parties 
necessitates interlocutary injunctions. In the following regulation of Malik laid 
down by Ibn al-Qásim in the Mudawwana, the plaintiff sustained an action for 
restitution. The object at issue is handed over with a security deposit until such 
time as he can bring full evidence. If suing for the restitution of a slave, 
incomplete evidence suffices —i. e. one rather than two direct witnesses 
(shàhid, pi. shuhüd) or only a hearsay witness (sama ')'^^— and the slave will be 
returned. In exchange he has to deposit the value (qlma) of the slave. This 
procedure enables the plaintiff to bring full evidence. Therefore, he is allowed 
to travel with the slave to the domicile of the witnesses to present full evidence 
to the qàdi of that village.^^ As a rule, the giving of evidence before the qàdi 
presupposes the presence of the claimed object.^ ^ If the plaintiff brings full 
evidence and the slave is awarded to him, he can reclaim the sum on deposit. If 
he is not able to support his claim with appropriate evidence, he must return the 
slave in exchange for the deposit. This regulation is appropriate in the case of 
the runaway slave, a common occurance in legal practice. When the slave was 
found in a remote location, there was a practical necessity for such proceedings. 
When absent witnesses had to testify at the court of the plaintiff, it was 
necessary to secure the plaintiff's claim until the witnesses arrived before the 
qàdi. According to Ibn al-Qasim in the Mudawwana, this preliminary protection 
is realised in the claim for restitution by seizing the claimed object (ïqàf). If a 
^^  Such is the case in claims of God (huquq Allah) like the most hudud. See Scholz, 
Verfahrensrechu 469, 471, 484 ff. 
32 Cf. Sahnün, I. c , VI 259 f; Ibn Rushd, 1. c , H 576. 
33 Cf. Sahnün, 1. c , VI 183. 
^^ Concerning the hearsay witness see Scholz, Verfahrensrecht, 201 ff. 
35 C/Sahnün, Lc.,V 183. 
36 See Scholz, Verfahrensrecht, 209. 
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plaintiff sues for the restoration of his slave, brings a witness (shàhid) or hearsay 
witness (sama') and asserts further witnesses to be present (hudür) in the qàdî's 
village, he may demand that the qàdi seizes the slave until full evidence is 
brought. On the other hand, if it is «remote evidence (bayyina ba Ida)»^'^ and the 
seizure of the slave may cause damage to the defendant (mudda 'a 'alaihi), the 
qàdi allows the defendant to swear the purgative oath, before releasing him 
without a personal guarantor (kafil)?^ The slave is seized in order to ensure his 
presence at the oral hearing and secure the plaintiff's claim. The seizure not only 
presupposes a sign like a single witness for the entitlement of the plaintiff's 
claim but also «near evidence» or the fact that there is no danger that the seizure 
causes a loss for the defendant. In the case of «remote evidence» and damage 
threatening the defendant, the plaintiff has no possibility of securing his claim 
by seizure of the claimed object or taking a personal guarantor for the defendant. 
Rather, the procedure will continue following the general rules, ff the defendant 
takes the purgative oath, the qadi will decide in his favour. However, we are not 
told whether the plaintiff is allowed to present his witnesses after such 
judgement, causing the qadi to reverse the judgment so that in the end the 
plaintiff wins the action. 
An answer to this question is found in the general discussion of the 
admissibility of the plaintiff's evidence after the defendant's oath. In this context 
the practical problem of the distances between the plaintiff and the witnesses is 
also discussed. Concerning this question, Ibn al-Qàsim in the Mudawwana 
relates that, as a rule, the witness testimony following the defendant's oath is not 
allowed even when the plaintiff (tülib), who knew the evidence, has made the 
defendant (matlüb) swear because the witnesses were not present at court. But 
if the plaintiff explains to the qàdi that he has «remote evidence» (bayyina 
ghà'iba, bayyina balda) and there is the risk that the debtor (gharîm) might 
disappear, or it takes too much time to present the witnesses, it will be 
admissible first to let the defendant take the oath and then to hear the witnesses. 
If the witnesses stay at a village at a distance of not more than three days' 
travelling time, they will not be heard after the defendant's oath.^ ^ 
In the case of absent witnesses, the plaintiff's claim is provisionally 
secured by arresting the defendant, especially in claims concerning the body 
"^^  I. e. the witnesses do not stay in the qàdi's village, so that they cannot be heard in short time. 
^^  Cf. Sahnûn, 1. c., V 183 f. - Concerning the personal guaranty (kafila bi-n-nafs) see 
Sachan, E., Muhammedanisches Recht nach schafiitischer Lehre, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1897,405 ff., 
and Gentz, J., «Die Biirgschaft im islamischen Recht nach al-Kàsânî», Zeitschrift fUr vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft, 62 (1960), 85, 151 f and 155 f. 
39 Cf. Sahnûn, 1. c , V 175, 137. 
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of the defendant. Ibn al-Qasim in the Mudawwana presents the following 
regulation: In suing for retaliation (qisas) because of injuries (jiràhàt) or 
something else referring to the body, the defendant will be arrested on 
condition that the plaintiff (mudda 1) has already brought a witness (shàhid), 
asserts a «present evidence (bayyina Mdira)»'^^ and announces presentation 
in court the next day. If a man asserts that another has committed a hadd 
crime and his witnesses can be presented by the next day, the accused will 
also be arrested. In neither case will a personal guarantor for the defendant or 
accused be taken."^ ^ The arrest ensures that the defendant or accused will not 
escape retaliation or punishment. 
Human mobility causes problems in legal practice when a party involved in 
a case is unknown at the place of jurisdiction. In the Mudawwana, Ibn al-Qasim 
discusses the following example: Witnesses (shuhüd) testify sexual intercourse 
between a man and a woman. The accused asserts that the woman is his wife 
or his slave, thereby entitling him to engage with her in intercourse, but the 
witnesses do not know this to be true. If all involved come from the village 
where the intercourse occured, the man will not be punished for unchastity 
(zinà), if he brings full evidence (bayyina) of his assertion."^^ The fact that the 
witnesses know nothing about the marriage makes it probable that the man is 
untruthful. A wedding being a public event, the villagers would be aware of it. 
If the man and the woman come from another village, the man will not be 
punished either if the woman supports his claim."^ ^ In this example, witness 
ignorance is not synonymous with an untruthful claim. Besides, it would be 
difficult for the accused to defend himself because he would hardly find 
witnesses for the fact of having married or purchased a slave in another village. 
So Ibn al-Qàsim's discussion seems to be justified by practical reasons. 
In the Mudawwana, hearsay testimony (shahàdat as-sanià ') is discussed. 
Within this context, we find an example in which the problem of human 
imperfection is regulated by real life. A man overhears a legally relevant 
remark while passing by. Someone claims that another has killed or been 
unchaste or divorced from his wife. Later on, the overhearer is asked to testify 
to this utterance. The problem here is that overheard speech can be incomplete 
or taken out of context. Ibn al-Qasim relates two opinions of Malik. In early 
times, Malik rejected such testimony, but according to his later opinion, such 
"^ L e. the witaesses are staying in the qàdi's village, so that they can be heard in short time. 
1^ Cf. Sahnûn, 1. c , V 182. 
^'- Cf. Sahnûn, 1. c , VI 202. 
43 Cf Sahnûn, 1. c , VI 202. 
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testimony was admissible. Ibn al-Qàsim begs to differ, admitting the testimony 
only on condition that the passer-by has overheard the utterance completely."^ 
IL LEGAL PRACTICE ARGUMENTS WHICH JUSTIFY LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
REGULATIONS 
The influence of legal practice in the Sharia can also be seen in the 
justification of institutions and regulations through the necessities of legal 
practice to some degree. This argument is often pronounced explicitly, but in 
some cases it can be inferred from circumstances. Legal institutions and 
regulations seek to protect rightful owners against loss and defendants against 
unjustified claims. 
1. Protection of the Owner against the Loss of a Right 
Ibn al-Qàsim seeks to secure the right to administer justice by stating in the 
Mudawwana that the seat (majlis) of the qàdi should neither be elevated nor 
screened, allowing ordinary men and women to come to him."^ ^ This regulation 
is a necessary expedient because people would not otherwise approach."^ This 
right is based on an according experience of legal practice. 
Several legal institutions and regulations exist to take the claimant's 
evidence. First, there is the hearsay witness (shahàdat as-samà '), We find an 
example in the Mudawwana taken by Ibn al-Qàsim from Malik. In Medina 
there are many houses whose original owners were universally known. The 
houses changed hands. As with the passage of time there are no more 
eyewitnesses,"^^ the proprietors are allowed to offer evidence for the legal basis 
(asl) of their ownership by the shahàdat as-samà'."^^ In the same text, Ibn al-
Qàsim reports the opinion of Malik concerning the admissibility of the 
shahàdat as-samà' with regard to charitable endowments. If the eyewitnesses 
for a charitable endowment (hubs) have died and only hearsay witnesses 
remain, the endowment will be valid. The precedent is that only hearsay 
witnesses (sama') remained for the charitable endowments of the Prophet's 
44 Cf. Sahnün, L c, V 169, 132 f. 
45 Cf. Sahnün, 1. c, V 144. 
46 Cf Sahnün, 1. c, V 144. 
47 Cf Sahnün, 1. c, V 171 f, 192, 194. 
48 Cf Sahnün, 1. c, V 172, 192, 194. 
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Companions. Ibn al-Qásim also reports that in Medina Malik's judgement is 
based on hearsay testimony."^^ 
The testimony of minors (shahàdat as-sibyàn) has also to be mentioned here. 
The Mahkites admit it in assault and partly in manslaugther between minors 
only immediately after the event and if no one has tried to influence them.^ ^ 
These restrictions are based on the material consideration that the testimony of 
minors is less trustworthy than that of adults. Ibn Rushd states explicitly that 
minors must not be separated to prevent false testimony.^ ^  As long as the minors 
have not been separated following the quarrel and nobody has influenced them, 
their testimony will be considered as exceptionally trustworthy. Considering the 
distrust concerning the testimony of minors, it is difficult to explain why their 
testimonies are admitted at all in assault and partly in manslaughter cases. This 
could be expedient as in such circumstances adults are often not present. Assault 
and manslaughter claims could not be successful if the plaintiff is unable to offer 
evidence.^^ Ibn Rushd seems to refer to this necessity when he calls Malik's 
admission (ijàza) of minors' testimony concerning manslaugther an analogy 
based on common well (qiyàs al-maslaha)P 
According to Quran 2, 282, witness testimony must be given by two men or 
one man and two women. If testimony is given by female witnesses only, this 
regulation enables the party holding the burden of proof to testify, even if there are 
no male witnesses. Ibn al-Qásim relates that the Medinan legal scholar Rabfa b. 
Abï 'Abd al-Rahmin,^ "^ a member of the generation following that of the Prophet's 
Companions, admitted the testimony of two women concerning the beginning of 
labour pains (istihlàl) because this specific circumstance can be testified by women 
only.^ ^ According to Ibn Rushd, the prevailing opinion is that female testimony is 
admissible only in claims concerning women's bodies (huqüq al-abdàn), 
especially deHvery, labour and women's «defects» ('uyub)}^ Without female 
testimony, these facts cannot be proved because male witnesses are not available. 
The continuous application of the pre-Islamic procedure of the qasama is 
necessary in order to render the plaintiff's claim successful. This procedure is 
9^ C/Sahnün, L c , V 171. 
50 Cf. Malik, 1. c , 726 f; Sahnün, 1. c , V 163 f; al-Qayrawànî, Ar-Risàla, Bercher, L. (ed. a. 
transi.). La Risàla ou Epître sur les éléments du dogme et de la loi de VIslam selon le rite màlikite 
par Aboü Muhammad 'Abdallah Ibn Abï Zaid al-Qayrawàni, Traduction française, 8* Edition, 
Algiers, 1980, 264; Ibn Rushd, 1. c , H 568. 
51 Cf. Ibn Rushd, 1. c , H 568. 
52 This is also supposed by Schacht, Origins, 218. 
53 Cf Ibn Rushd, 1. c , H 568. 
5^  Rabî'a b. Abï 'Abd al-Rahmàn Farrûkh at-Taimï, d. 132-143/749-760. 
55 Transmitted via Ibn Wahb. Cf Sahnün, L c , V 157 f, 161. Cf also Sahnün, 1. c , m 45. 
56 C/IbnRushd, 1. c, n571. 
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used for claims of retaliation (qawad, qisàs) or blood money (diya) in cases of 
murder and involuntary manslaughter through culpable negligence (qatl al-
'amd, qatl aUkhap. '). The relatives of the deceased have the right to demand 
vengeance. They swear fifty oaths of the defendant's guilt to justify their claim. 
If the relatives do not swear, the clan of the defendant can swear fifty oaths on 
his innocence in order to reject the claim.^ '^  Malik justifies this procedure in the 
Muwatta' as follows: in the case of witness testimony (bayyina), murders and 
manslaughters would increase and the «rights of blood» (dimà ') (claims for 
retaliation and blood-money) would be lost, because the crime was not 
committed in public. It is therefore qasàma's responsibility to deter people 
from committing murder and manslaughter.^^ Within the context of discussing 
the admissibility of the qasàma, Ibn Rushd also states in his Bidàya that the 
traditional procedure (sunna) is designed to protect against murder and 
manslaughter (dimà'). Whilst these crimes are numerous, witnesses are rare 
because such crimes ai*e usually committed out of sight.^ ^^  
2. Protection of the Defendant against Unjustified Claims 
Legal practice is reflected in several institutions and regulations which serve 
to protect the defendant against unjustified claims. For example, the defendant's 
oath (yamin al-mudda 'à 'alaih) will be taken if the plaintiff is unable to present 
witness testimony (bayyina). According to the Malikites, an action (da'wà) 
can not be successful by itself because a single action does not argue for the 
probability (shubha) of its justification. Ibn Rushd quotes the Prophet: «If 
people were awarded their rights only because of their actions (da 'àwà), they 
would sue each other for blood-rights (dimà') and items of property (amwàl); it 
is the defendant who must swear the oath.»^° The authenticity of this quotation, 
however, is doubtful. The defendant's oath results from practical experience. If 
lawsuits were always successful, many unjustified lawsuits would result. 
Legal practice determines both presuppositions and range of application for 
the defendant's oath. According to the Malikites, the defendant's oath is 
allowed only under the presupposition of specific contact (khalta, mukhàlata, 
^^  Such is the procedure according to the Malikites, see Scholz, Verfahrensrecht, 388 ff. 
5^  Cf. Malik, 1. c , 880. 
59 Cf. Ibn Rushd, 1. c , II 523. 
°^ Cf. Ibn Rushd, 1. c , II 527. The hadith was transmitted via Ibn 'Abbas and quoted by 
Muslim in his Sahih. 
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mulàbasa) between plaintiff and defendant.^ ^ Ibn Rushd relates Malik's 
reference to the common well (maslaha) which requires a restriction of the 
defendant's oath to avoid suing even if their actions were not justifíed.^^ 
According to Ibn al-Qàsim, the same reason stands for the defendant's oath not 
to be allowed, if the buyer (mushtari) of a slave accuses the seller (bâ'V) of 
having sold him a runaway or a mentally deficient slave. It would be to general 
detriment if this were allowed, because the buyer would make the seller swear 
one day concerning the runaway, the other day with regard to the theft (sariga), 
then to unchastity (zinà) or mental deficiency.^^ Obviously, it is necessity to 
protect slave merchants against unjustified legal action. 
Legal practice also created the pronouncement of witness integrity (tazkiya) 
through the function of the muzakki, which was then incorporated into the Sharia. 
A witness must be of honest character ( 'adl). In practice it is difficult to verify this, 
if the witness is unknown to the qàdi. Tyan states, with reference to the Egyptian 
historian al-Kindî,^ that the Egyptian qàdi, Jawth b. Sulaimàn,^ ^ introduced a 
procedure by which the qàdi admits a witness only on the condition that his 
integrity is proved and established by an official pronouncement (tazkiya).^ 
Based on historical sources, the qàdi had assistants, known as muzakkm,^'^ to 
investigate the integrity of witnesses. These innovations were introduced firstly 
into the Mudawwana. According to Malik's opinion as quoted in this text, 
witnesses whose integrity ('adàla) is well known to the qàdi do not require a 
pronouncement of their integrity. But if the qàdi has no information about an 
individual, he will question others.^ ^ The assistant is first mentioned by Ibn al-
Qàsim, who states that the qàdi should choose a man to investigate the witness.^ ^ 
Testimony which is suspected of subjectivity is not admitted.^^ According to 
the Mudawwana, the legal scholars Ibn Shihab^^ and Yahyà b. Sa'îd^^ of 
61 Cf. Malik, 1. c , 725 f; Sahnün, 1. c , V 136 f, 174 ff; al-Qayrawànï, 1. c , 260; Ibn Rushd, 1. 
c , 11 580. 
62 Cf. Ibn Rushd, 1. c , II 580. 
63 Cf Sahnün, 1. c , IV 328 f. 
^ Tyan, É., Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire en pays d'Islam, 2"^ ^ Edition, Leiden, 1960, 
238 f. 
65 140/757-144/761. 
66 Cf Tyan, 1. c, 238 f. 
67 Cf Tyan, 1. c, 240 Fn. 3. 
68 Cf Sahnün, 1. c, V 144 f, 202. 
69 Cf Sahnün, 1. c, VI 290. 
70 Cf Mâlik, 1. c , 720; Sahnûn, 1. c , V 152; al-Qayrawinï, 1. c , 262 f; Ibn Rushd, 1. c , H 569. 
7' Ibn Shihâb az-Zuhrî, d. 124/742. 
72 Abu Sa'îd Yahyà b. Sa'ïd b. Qays al-Ansàrî, Umayyad qàdi in Medina and Abbasid qàdi in 
Irak, d. 143/760. 
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Medina, members of the generation following that of the Prophet's Companions, 
thought that in the times of the «honest ancestors» the testimonies (shahàdàt) of 
father in favour of son, of son in favour of father, of brother in favour of brother 
and of husband in favour of wife were not suspect. They believed that human 
character deteriorated in a later period and therefore, with the passage of time, 
the testimonies of close relatives were no longer acceptables^ Obviously, it was 
necessary for legal practice to place restrictions on testimony in favour of 
relatives. This is justified by the decline in moral standards. 
In legal practice, the parties involved in a case are often ignorant of their 
procedural rights. This may be due to legal ignorance or the variety of jurists' legal 
opinions and their different interpretations. Thus it is the responsibility of the 
judge to clarify procedural rights. In the Mudawwana, Ibn al-Qasim's opimon is 
that if the party against whom testimony is given does not know his right to accuse 
the witness of unrighteousness, the qàdi must explain it to him. He may have 
knowledge regiirding the witness's integrity7"^ In order to justify this regulation, 
Ibn al-Qasim draws an analogy from a regulation Malik once told him: Ibn al-
Qasim asked Malik if the qàdi would immediately decide in favour of the plaintiff 
(mudda 1) when the defendant (mudda 'à 'alaihi) refused to take the oath (yamin), 
or if he should ask the plaintiff to swear first. Malik stated that the qàdi had not to 
condemn the defendant until the plaintiff had been given the opportunity to swear 
an oath and this right had been explained to him. The parties were often ignorant 
that the oath was transmitted to the plaintiff after refusal by the defendant.^ ^ Malik 
recognized that the Medinan legal practice of transmitting the oath to the plaintiff 
was rejected by many legal scholars, especially the Hanañtes.^^ 
C. FINAL REFLECTIONS 
1. Legal Practice in Malikite Lawbooks 
Legal practice permeated the lawbooks of the Sharia in various ways. Early 
legal practice has found its way into the Sharia from such legal sources as the 
Quran and hadith to the degree that they included legal practice. Historical legal 
^^  Cf. Sahnün, 1. c , V 155; chains of traditioners: Ibn Wahb - Yùnus b. Yazïd - Ibn Shihab, Ibn 
Wahb - Yahyà b. Ayyûb - Yahyà b. Sa'ïd. 
74 Cf. Sahnün, 1. c , VI 283 f. 
"^^ Cf. Sahnün, 1. c , VI 284. Cf. also the opinion of Ibn Abï Házim, a student of Malik, in 
Sahnün, 1. c , V 137, 174. 
7^  Cf Scholz, Verfahrensrecht, 347 ff. 
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practice may still correspond to the current legal practice of that age but it can 
be out of date. However, formerly current legal practice, herein discussed, is 
incorporated into the lawbooks by the legal scholars. The extent of such 
incorporation depends inter alia on the type and extent of the lawbooks and on 
their intention. The Malikite law of procedure up to the 6*/12^^  century can be 
described through an examination of the four most important and fully edited 
Malikite lawbooks. 
In the Muwatta ' we find extensive historical legal practice in the form of 
ahàdith, which was not investigated in this article, and to a lesser extent, the 
contemporary legal practice of the author. Such reference to legal practice is 
not surprising. It is the intention of this book to present a survey of the 
commonly accepted tradition (sunna) and practice ( 'amal) of law in Medina, 
accompanied by a gloss.^^ The predominance of historical over contemporary 
legal practice is based on the general local consensus which developped 
historically since the time of the successors of the Prophet's Companions, the 
Prophet's Companions, and occasionally the Prophet himself. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that at the time of the Muwatta \ historical legal practice 
still corresponded to the current legal practice of that age. 
What was once current legal practice permeated into the Mudawwana 
through the ma^^'//-character^^ and enormous size of the lawbook. Sahnûn 
presents a question and answer format. He asks Malik's opinion concerning 
a special legal problem or an abstract case and Ibn al-Qásim then answers 
with Malik's opinion, that of another jurist, or one of his own. The Sharia 
is not presented in a strictly systematic manner so that there is space for 
current legal problems. Furthermore, the casuistic style of regulation 
facilitates the permeation of current legal cases. Finally, the exorbitant size 
of the Mudawwana involves a greater output of regulations referring to 
legal practice. 
In the Risàla of al-Qairawânï and the Bidàya of Ibn Rushd, the influence of 
formerly current legal practice on the law of procedure can be demonstrated 
only occasionally. The Risàla is just a short summary of Malikite doctrine 
•^^ Cf. Schacht, J., in EI^ and Ef s.v. «Malik b. Anas»; Cottart in Ef s.v. «Málikiyya»; 
Muranyi, M., «Religiose Literatur in arabischer Sprache», Helmut Gatje (éd.), Grundrifi der 
Arabischen Philologie, Part 2, Wiesbaden, 1987, 299, 313. Concerning the relationship between 
'amal and hadît see Dutton, Y., «Sunna, Hadith and Madinan 'Amah, Journal of Islamic Studies 4 
(1993), 7; id., «'Amal versus Hadith in Islamic law: The Case of Sadl al-yadayn (Holding One's 
Hands by One's Sides) when Doing Prayer», Islamic Law and Society 3 (1996), 13 ff. 
'^^ This means to be written in a question and answer format {cf. Daiber in Ef s.v. «Masa'il 
wa-adjwiba»). 
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which was originally didactic in intent. It almost exclusively contains general 
basic rules relating in some way to legal practice. The Bidàya belongs to 
ikhtilàf literature which presents the main disputes (ikhtilâfàt) in the great 
lawschools (madhàhib). It contains basic rules and related legislation only.^ ^ 
Reference to legal practice is mostly to be found in Ibn Rushd's explanations 
of the basis (sabab) of the dispute and the different arguments. 
2. Legal Practice in Malikite Law of Procedure 
In Malikite law of procedure, legal practice is most clearly reflected where 
legal institutions are explicitly or indirectly justified by their practical 
necessity. Thus the testimony of minors concerning injuries or manslaughter 
between their peers and the testimony of women concerning intimate facts are 
allowed, although minors and women are not regularly allowed to be witnesses. 
Such regulations ensure the success of the plaintiff's claim. Contrary to the 
more restricted provisions of indirect testimony,^^ hearsay testimony will be 
allowed if eyewitnesses do not exist. The pronouncement of witness integrity 
and the role of the legal assistant (muzakkï) also have their origins in legal 
practice. They represent the practical result of the dogmatic requirement of 
witness integrity. The defendant's oath is, as a rule, considered necessary to 
protect the defendant from unjustified actions.^ ^ The qàa's letter serves to 
surmount the distance between the parties involved in a case and between these 
parties and the object sued for. The pre-Islamic institution of the qasàma 
remains current because in legal practice it was difficult to offer evidence of 
manslaughter. 
Numerous regulations or abstract case-regulations are likely also based on 
legal practice. These regulations concern the hearing of witnesses testimony 
and court procedure. They also refer to the testimony concerning the overheard 
statement of an unseen third party and the testimony of a witness suspected of 
false declarations because of his relationship to a party involved in the case. 
Furthermore, proceedings in special constellations probably derive from legal 
practice especially in exchange of qudàt, in cases of distance between the 
parties involved or between such a party and the object which is sued for, or 
^^  Brunschvig, R., «Aveixoès juriste», Etudes d'orientalisme dédiées à la mémoire de Lévi-
Provençal, Part I, Paris, 1962, 35, 41. 
0^ See Scholz, Verfahrensrecht, 198 ff. 
'^ As a rule, the plaintiff who has no full evidence will only be able to win his action, if the 
defendant denies his purgative oath. See Scholz, Verfahrensrecht, 347 ff and 355 ff. 
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when claims should be provisionally secured. Finally, there also exist rules of 
evidence which demonstrate their basis in an actual case. They mostly concern 
the proceeding when there are no witnesses. 
ABSTRACT 
The traditional opinion of the Sharia as an ideal completely detached from actual 
legal practice is more and more given up by recent studies. The ability of the Sharia to 
absorb current legal practice depends on the genre of law literature and the field of law. 
The author has examined the law of procedure presented in the most important Malikite 
lawbooks up to the 6*/12* century for material relevant to practice and arranged the 
material by the criteria of reference to formerly contemporary legal practice. This 
enables the author on the one hand to demonstrate to what extent formerly current legal 
practice permeated the Malikite lawbooks, and the other hand to outline the extent of the 
influence the incorporated legal practice has had on the Malikite law of procedure. 
RESUMEN 
La vieja concepción de la sarï'a como un ideal sin ninguna relación con la práctica 
jurídica está siendo abandonada cada vez más gracias a los resultados de recientes inves-
tigaciones. La capacidad de la sarï'a para absorber la práctica jurídica de cada época 
puede ser analizada a partir de los distintos géneros de la literatura jurídica y del campo 
del Derecho. En este artículo se analiza el material relativo a los procedimientos jurídi-
cos que se encuentra en los textos legales málikíes más importantes hasta el siglo vi/xii, 
con especial atención a los datos concernientes a la práctica jurídica. Ese material ha 
sido organizado siguiendo el criterio de hacer referencia a la práctica legal de la época. 
Esto permite, por un lado, comprobar hasta qué punto esa práctica permeaba los textos 
jurídicos mahkíes y, por otro lado, esbozar la influencia que la práctica legal tuvo en los 
procedimientos jurídicos de la escuela málikí. 
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